This article was written by Haider Al-Mosawi, INSM Organization.

Rather than expanding digital freedoms after the fall of the Baath Party’s dictatorial regime in 2003, successive Iraqi governments have developed new tools and policies that restrict online rights and undermine efforts to build an open and secure digital space. Despite sustained advocacy by digital rights organizations and human rights defenders to establish digital freedoms as a fundamental, non-negotiable human right, these governments have continued to obstruct such efforts, reinforcing state control over the digital sphere instead of protecting and advancing digital rights.

Perhaps the most prominent step taken by the Iraqi Parliament to obstruct these efforts was its disregard for the “Right of Access to Information Law.” Had the law been implemented, it would have enabled journalists, human rights defenders, and even the general public to access the information they need to help support transparency and curb corruption by pursuing and exposing it. 

The proposed legislation remained locked away in the Parliament’s drawers, with only feeble attempts to discuss it. At the same time, attempts emerged to pass laws and regulations aimed at “regulating media content” or “combating cybercrime,” all of which were riddled with loopholes that would restrict freedom of expression instead of building a free digital space.

Consistent with its broader policies, which do not prioritize the protection of digital freedoms, the Iraqi government has increasingly relied on “alternative” tools to restrict the digital space and its users without the need to enact new legislation. This shift has come as the government has been unable to pass the laws and regulations it had sought to introduce due to sustained pressure from civil society organizations and digital rights advocates.

The “Ballegh” Platform: “Combating Degrading Content”

On January 10, 2023, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior introduced the “Ballegh” platform, a tool to combat alleged “degrading content,” which the ministry said included content that “offends public taste, violates modesty, and undermines social stability.” This marked the beginning of restrictions on the freedoms of content creators, the imposition of digital guardianship over influencers, and the determination of what is permitted and what is prohibited.

The Ministry of Interior did not explain any constitutional or legal mechanisms regarding the measures and standards used to classify content. The arrests and detentions resulting from reports submitted through the platform targeted singers, comedians, women active in the digital space, poets, and restaurant owners. The platform also caused psychological harm to the purported producers of “degrading content.”

The negative impact of the Ballegh platform was not limited to digital restrictions, the imprisonment of women, and pushing them to practice a form of self-censorship. It had also started posing a real threat to their lives. 

On April 26, 2024, Iraqi influencer Um Fahad was assassinated by an unknown assailant outside her home in Baghdad. In the period leading up to her assassination, the Ballegh platform had contributed to a negative public image of her. She had previously been imprisoned following proceedings initiated through the platform, which subjected her to public stigmatization and incitement. To date, her killer has not been brought to justice.

The platform remains in use to this day.

The Media Commission and the National Contact Point: A Newly Created Tool for Restriction

A digital body known as the “National Contact Point” recently emerged. It appeared to several bloggers and journalists on Facebook after their posts and accounts were blocked in Iraq, while others were removed permanently. This appears to have happened either because of a “legal request” submitted by the National Contact Point to Meta, or supposedly to protect copyright without any clear reason being given for the violation on which the blocking was based. 

The blocked posts included files related to exposing corruption, as well as content concerning Iraq’s new prime minister, Ali Faleh Al-Zaidi. 

The posts did not contain any violations of Meta’s standards, nor did they involve any “rights” as stated in some of the blocking notices.

The notifications received by bloggers and activists on Facebook did not allow page owners to appeal the decision, challenge it, or understand how it conflicts with local laws. Instead, the notice was phrased as follows: “Your post is not available in Iraq. Reason: Based on legal request No. (####), we had to restrict access to your post.”

In November 2025, Meta reported that it had received 51 requests from the “Iraqi National Contact Point” to restrict access to 52 Facebook pages and groups, as well as 327 posts on Facebook and Instagram. Meta explained that failure to comply with the National Contact Point’s requests could result in a potential ban on advertising and the Central Bank of Iraq preventing payments to Meta.

According to Meta’s statement, as of that date, it had restricted access to 194 Facebook and Instagram posts allegedly containing defamatory statements and insults directed at the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Defense and Interior, the head of the National Wisdom Movement (Al-Hikma), Ammar Al-Hakim, members of the Iraqi security forces, members of Parliament, the Communications and Media Commission, the Iraqi judiciary, the Mayor of Baghdad, and the Basra Chief of Police.

Among the content that Meta restricted was digitally manipulated or AI-generated content, as well as leaked government documents, on the grounds that they “violated local law.” 

At the same time, Meta took no action against 49 Facebook pages and groups that were said to contain criticism of government officials and political candidates, allegations of corruption involving members of Parliament, the Ministry of Electricity, and the Wasit Electricity Distribution Directorate, in addition to allegedly leaked government documents.

Meta’s approach to restricting content points to a troubling shift in the way it responds to government requests. The company has complied with requests based on repressive and broadly worded laws, such as those in Iraq, as well as government interpretations that are not grounded in clear standards or criteria for classifying content. Moreover, Meta’s response was not guided by the protection of freedom of expression or the public interest in the digital space, but rather by pressure that threatened its commercial interests and advertising business in Iraq.

In a recent television interview, the head of the Communications and Media Commission, Baligh Abu Kalal, revealed further details about the National Contact Point. He explained that it is an Iraqi body which he personally chairs and which includes representatives from the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the National Security Service, the Supreme Judicial Council, and the Ministry of Communications. He added that decisions to block content are made unanimously by these bodies after reviewing the reported content, with justifications including support for terrorism, incitement to sectarianism, and content deemed “immoral.”

Within its content restriction policies, Meta states that it restricts access to content pursuant to local laws. The company explains that “when governments believe that content on the internet violates their laws, they may contact Meta and request that access to the content be restricted.”

Furthermore, Meta states that “if, following careful legal review, we determine that the content is unlawful under local law, we make the content unavailable in the relevant country or territory. For example, Holocaust denial is illegal in Germany. Therefore, if such content is reported to us, we will restrict its availability to people in Germany.” 

It can therefore be argued that Meta’s decisions are no longer based solely on its own Community Standards, but increasingly respond to domestic legislation in individual countries, even when the content falls outside the scope of violations under those standards.

During the interview, Abu Kalal referred to an incident involving a political analyst who accused former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani of “collaboration and normalization” in a post published on X, after which he was banned from making media appearances. Abu Kalal added that he “does not accept insults directed at the Iraqi Prime Minister and cannot tolerate accusations of treason against the country’s Prime Minister without taking action.”

This discourse raises important questions about the standards used to determine what constitutes an offense warranting censorship or sanctions, and where the line is drawn between freedom of expression and violations of digital standards from the perspective of the Communications and Media Commission.

It is also worth noting that Abu Kalal is a senior figure in one of Iraq’s political parties. During his tenure as head of the Communications and Media Commission, cases have been documented in which critical content exposing corruption files linked to the political party to which he belongs was blocked. This raises serious concerns about the potential misuse of state institutions and resources to serve partisan political interests.

The Iraqi judiciary has also supported content and website blocking measures. On March 14, 2024, the Federal Supreme Court issued a ruling ordering the blocking of websites, internet networks, and electronic communication platforms that contain the “production and dissemination of content that violates morals and public decency, degrading content that offends modesty, insults the ‘Divine Being’ or the sanctity of holy books, disparages prophets, messengers, and religious figures, insults religions and sects, promotes and disseminates debauchery, prostitution, and homosexuality, or targets and abuses others.” Each of these accusations is open to multiple interpretations and can be broadly applied to virtually any type of content.

Blocking Telegram

As the use of Telegram in Iraq has grown for a wide range of purposes, most notably education, the application has been blocked several times. The latest incident occurred on April 3, when the app suddenly stopped working across all Iraqi governorates except the Kurdistan Region, without any official announcement from either the government or Telegram. This prompted users to seek alternative ways to access the platform, such as using virtual private networks (VPNs), particularly since the disruption affected their ability to work, communicate, and study, while also exposing them to the risks associated with using insecure methods to circumvent the block.

Nearly a month after the service was disrupted, the Communications and Media Commission announced that the ban had been lifted after Telegram’s management pledged to comply with the regulatory requirements concerning content moderation and user protection, and to adhere to Iraq’s applicable legal framework. The Commission also stated that it remained prepared to block the platform again should it fail to comply.

The Internet Shutdown Dilemma

Despite the availability of digital technologies that can securely manage examination materials and prevent unauthorized access, Iraqi authorities have continued to rely on nationwide internet shutdowns during examination periods. The new Minister of Communications, Mustafa Sanad, announced that internet access would be suspended for one and a half hours each exam day—from 6:00 to 7:30 a.m.—arguing that the measure was necessary to prevent the recurring leakage of examination questions before exams begin. However, despite years of recurring leaks, the government has failed to adopt more targeted and effective solutions, continuing instead to impose blanket internet shutdowns that disrupt the work, education, and daily lives of millions of people across Iraq.

Sanad explained that, by next year, he hopes to eliminate internet shutdowns during examinations altogether by introducing a dedicated system that would allow the Minister of Education to “press a button” and deliver examination questions simultaneously to all schools, preventing any leaks before the scheduled time. For now, however, this remains merely a proposal on paper, with attention turning to what 2027 may bring.

Digital Activity That Justifies the Killing of Women

The Communications and Media Commission and the Ministry of Interior claim to be combating “degrading content” that incites hatred and threatens public security through the Ballegh platform. However, in reality, hate speech, incitement, and threats continue to spread across social media, particularly those targeting women, without any meaningful government response. 

This is despite the existence of well-known platforms affiliated with armed groups operating outside the law, which continue to publish inciting content with complete impunity.

On March 2, 2026, human rights defender and feminist activist Yanar Mohammed was killed in an armed attack outside her residence in northern Baghdad. At the same time, posts reporting her death spread across social media, accompanied by comments justifying her killing and inciting violence against other women. 

No security measures were taken against these posts or against those who published information claiming to explain the motive for her murder or who openly incited it. At the time of writing, the security authorities had still not identified the perpetrator, who had escaped accountability thanks to a digital environment that legitimized his crime.

This recalls the events of 2020, when civil society activist Reham Yacoub was murdered after being subjected to a digital smear campaign accusing her of treason. Her killers were never identified or brought to justice.

Exploiting the Digital Space to Restrict Digital and Public Freedoms

Digital repression in Iraq continues to intensify through the government tools described above. At the same time, practices of “digital guardianship” over content creators have become increasingly common, alongside online incitement aimed at suppressing women’s freedoms.

For example, some content creators have launched sustained campaigns against other creators who are younger or have a smaller audience simply because they dislike their content, or because they oppose women expressing their views, among other reasons. 

These campaigns are reinforced by thousands of social media users who participate in online incitement under the pretext of combating “degrading content.” In many cases, this ultimately leads to the targeted individuals being arrested by the Ministry of Interior after hostile online campaigns generate public pressure against them.

One example is an Iraqi media personality whose Facebook page has more than two million followers. He publicly called on the Ministry of Interior to intervene and prohibit women from smoking shisha in public places, capitalizing on the support of thousands of users to push for repressive measures under the banner of “sanctity” in order to restrict basic personal freedom. 

The same media figure also imposed his own form of guardianship over a restaurant owner and the restaurant’s advertising campaign, pressuring him into issuing a public apology for the actions of content creators who had promoted his products and competitions.

Government officials, including ministers in the cabinet of Iraq’s former Prime Minister, and even the President himself, have filed lawsuits against bloggers, activists, and journalists over their social media posts, resulting in prison sentences.

At the same time, users’ personal data continues to be leaked without any government transparency regarding these incidents or any recommendations for addressing this serious challenge. 

Government actions have likewise reflected a troubling degree of negligence in this area. On June 29, 2025, the Iraqi government announced that it had donated 12,000 tablet devices used during the 2025 national census to Jordan, without providing any transparent information about how it handled the personal data of Iraqi citizens before making the donation, or what safeguards were taken to protect users’ privacy, despite stating that the devices contained no data.

As these practices and incidents continue to escalate, concerns are growing over the further erosion of freedom of expression online, the undermining of journalists’ freedoms and their ability to access information, and the spillover of digital violence into the physical world, particularly against women. 

As these developments continue to unfold, the Iraqi Parliament has increasingly failed to fulfill its responsibility to safeguard the freedoms its members pledged to uphold, instead appearing to align itself with an expanding system of digital repression.